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Changes in Post-Marital
Residence Rules in an Era of
National Reform: The Urban to
Rural Disjunction in
Contemporary China
Michaela S. Clemens
Abstract: Alternatives to the traditional practice of patrilocal postmarital residence exist in modern day China and vary from urban to
rural areas. Social and economic reforms that were instituted in postMao China had an influence on post-marital residence rules. These
refonns include marriage laws, reproduction restrictions, the return to
family fanns, and greater access to employment. Government refonns
had different impacts on urban and rural families, creating different
family structures and compositions. Family customs, like post-marital
residence, also diverged along rural and urban lines. In rural areas,
patrilocality persists, but matrilocal marriage arrangements are
increasing. In urban areas, a strong preference for neolocality is
evident. There are also indications that patrilocal and matrilocal
residence arrangements are becoming short-tenn transitions to
neolocal residence. Using a collection of post-Mao literature, this
paper examines the relationship between government policies and
changes in urban and rural post-marital residence rules in
contemporary China.

Introduction
Political and cultural transformations in China over the last
century have revolutionized the basic unit of Chinese society - the
family. What was once the archetype of strength and stability, the
complex, patriarchal family of traditional China was deconstructed and
re-formed under modem rule. Changes in family practices and customs
followed. In this environment of social and economic change, modem
Chinese families made new choices in post-marital residence practices.
Different impacts of national policies on rural and urban families
created two distinct patterns for residence choice: (1) a rural system
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still dominated by patrilocality, but with a noticeable rise in matrilocal
residence and (2) an urban system with a strong preference for neolocal
residence and indications of transient patrilocal and matrilocal
arrangements.
The theoretical basis for this study lies primarily in practice
theory - which couples the motivations of actions with the complexities
or strains of the situation (Ortner 2001). Cultural systems, like the
social and economic systems in modem China, shape, guide, and even
dictate behavior, such as where a couple chooses to reside after
marriage (Ortner 2001). Changes in systems are, therefore, often
reflected by changes in behavior. Scholars are aware of the affect of
industrialization on family structures and customs (e.g. Pasternak 1968;
Schnaiberg 1970; Sjoberg 1956). However, modernization alone
cannot account for transformations in post-marital residence rules in
China, nor can it duly explain the divergence of change from rural to
urban areas. Ortner (2001) suggests that "change comes about when
traditional strategies, which assume traditional patterns of relations, are
deployed in relation to novel phenomena which do not respond to those
strategies in traditional ways" (671). In China, the traditional strategy
of patrilocality met with unprecedented social and economic reforms
which prompted new strategies in post-marital residence.
The changes in residence customs that took place in 20th
century China, particularly within the last 25 years, had to contend with
a strong precedent of patrilocality set by hundreds of years of political,
religious, and cultural ideology. While modernization is often heralded
as a major proponent of cultural change (thus implying that change is
somehow inevitable), a host of institutions and ideas evolved in the
People's Republic of China that radically changed the way Chinese
individuals view the family structure and residence customs. Beyond
advancements in technology and education, a series of extraordinary
reforms were instituted following the Communist Party victory in 1949,
through the Cultural Revolution of the 1960-70's, and after the death of
communist leader Mao Zedong in 1976 that directly and indirectly
altered the way Chinese families function.
This paper reviews a collection of post-Mao literature that
examines the relationship between social policies and changes in urban
and rural Chinese family structure, in general, and post-marital
residence, in particular. Many of the recent papers are based on firsthand ethnographic studies conducted in China by Chinese and Western
researchers, despite China's previous reluctance toward Western
researchers. Several terms are used in these sources to describe
residence rules. Patrilocal (or virilocal) residence is defined as
customary residence with the husband's family after marriage where
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children are added to the paternal line. Matrilocal (or uxorilocal)
residence is the customary residence with the wife's family after
marriage and children are added to the maternal line. And, neolocality
refers to the post-marital residence pattern where a couple establishes a
new place of residence rather than living with either set of parents.

A Brie/History o/Post-Marital Residence Rules in China
For several thousand years family structure and customs in China were
dominated by Confucian ideology, which prescribed a natural order for
families and a proper role for every member (Croll 1985; Ebrey 1993;
Engel 1984). This organization stressed a son's obedience to his
parents, the worship of patrilineal ancestors, and a wife's obligations to
her husband's family. Female subordination was evident in the family
structure. In her natal home, a woman obeys her father; after marriage,
she serves her husband and is a perpetuator of his descent line; and
after her husband's death, she obeys her son (Ebrey 1993; Han 2003).

A Tradition

0/Patrilocality

Patrilocality was fundamental in maintammg the traditional
Chinese family structure. Traditionally, upon marriage, a daughter
moves from her natal home into her husband's home - or more
accurately her husband's parents' home. In this customary system, the
father-son relationship is paramount and daughter-in-laws have the
lowest status in the family (Tsui 1989). Patrilocality establishes a
descent group of core males related by common male ancestors where
wives are seen as outsiders (Pasternak et al. 1997). The strong
preference for sons is obvious in a system of patrilocality and
patrilineal descent where "sons perpetuate the patriline" and "daughters
produce offspring for other families" (Han 2003). Wealth was passed
down to sons through inheritance and to daughters in the form of a
dowry upon marriage (Ebrey 1993; Goody 1976). In this system
women achieve economic security and social status through marriage.
Until the 1930's large extended families were typical in both
urban and rural China with several generations living in the same home
(Tsui 1989). Typically, rural families had more children than families
in urban areas. This trend continues today where at least 80 percent of
contemporary Chinese people live and work in rural agricultural
provinces (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987). Historically, Chinese families
showed a greater preference for sons because sons "join the family
labor force (daughters marry out), continue the patrilineage, and
provide their parents with old age security" (Dalsimer & Nisonoff
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1987). Every Chinese man was encouraged to have many sons to fulfill
these familial obligations (Croll 1985). As parents relied solely on
their sons to provide for them as they grew old, patrilocality
strengthened gender differences in traditional China. This gender
inequality proved to be a major barrier to change in residence customs
over time.
The Matrilocal Alternative in Traditional China

Although patrilocality was dominant in traditional rural and
urban China, a number of researchers cite matrilocality as an alternative
form of residence that took place under specific conditions (e.g. Goody
1976; Han 2003; Li et al. 2000; Wolf 1985). Matrilocal residence
occurred historically for two reasons: preservative or practical (Han
2003). When a family had no son, a son-in-law was called in for a
daughter in order to preserve the family line. In this case, either the
son-in-law or one of the grandsons would adopt the family surname (Li
et al. 2000). Matrilocal residence also occurs when, for practical
reasons, families with few sons require additional male labor (Han
2003). Families that marry sons out matrilocally generally had too
many sons and too little land for inheritance (Pasternak et al. 1997).
References to the historic practice of matrilocal marriage frequently
note the stigmas and high costs associated with this alternative and,
thus, the reasons why patrilocality continued to dominate (discussed
further in the last section of this paper).
In pre-revolutionary China, the frequency of matrilocal
marriages was dependent on time and regional circumstance.
Patrilocality remained the dominant form of post-marital residence
according to political and religious customs for most of China's long
history. Following years of civil war in the early 20 th century, the
establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 brought about
almost immediate mandates for change in marriage practices and
family structures. Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, social and
economic reforms were enacted that had important consequences on the
dominance of patrilocality in Chinese families. After the death of the
communist leader and the end of the Cultural Revolution in the 1970's,
a new series of reforms were instituted. These post-Mao policies had
some of the strongest effects on Chinese family structure and postmarital residence rules in both urban and rural areas.
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Deconstructing Family Systems through Social Reforms

Since the creation of a classless socialist society in China was the
primary focus of communism, the "success of the socialist revolution in
China depends upon revolutionary change in the Chinese family"
(Engel 1984). The destruction of imperial stratification greatly
depended on the new government's ability to shift wealth and power
from patrilineal families into the hands of the collective people.
Revolutionizing the Chinese family involved, first, the destruction of
"the feudal marriage system" and, then, the reconstruction of a "new
Democratic marriage system" (Croll 1981: 1). Patrilineage and
patrilocal residence stood in direct opposition to communist ideals of
economic and gender equality.
The Introduction ofMarriage Laws in China

Immediately following the Communist Revolution, the new
Chinese government developed certain policies that specifically
targeted family structures and marriage customs. Enacted in 1950, the
Marriage Law was a bold move against the patriarchal family system
and a concerted effort to create greater gender equality by giving
women more economic autonomy and political independence (Croll
1983; Engel 1984). Some key aspects of the new policy were the
abolishment of arranged marriages, concubinage, and polygyny (Davis
& Harrell 1993). These reforms also gave women greater access to
divorce and inheritance and attempted to reshape the family unit in a
way that was more in line with national economic and social goals
(Palmer 1995).
Early government efforts to alter marriage customs and family
structure were often ineffectual and new policies were adopted in a
continuous process of achieving national goals. Following the death of
Mao Zedong, the successive leadership introduced a new set of family
laws in the late 1970's and early 1980's that strengthened previous
reforms and promoted new agendas like population reduction and
gender equality (Engel 1984; Palmer 1995). The 1980 marriage law
specifically addressed post-marital residence rules and included an
alternative to patrilocality: "Article 8. After a marriage has been
registered, the woman may become a member of the man's family, or
the man may become a member of the woman's family, according to
the agreed wishes of the two parties" (Engel 1984). The law was a clear
effort to elevate the status of daughters in a family by giving them the
opportunity to remain in their natal homes after marriage and support
their parents in their old age. Even now, evidence of these goals can be
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found throughout the country on large billboards as part of a national
publicity campaign to promote fewer children and raise the status of
girls. One recent article includes a picture of a billboard which reads,
"There's no difference between having a girl or a boy - girls can also
continue the family line" (Hesketh et al. 2005).
China's One-Child Family Policy

The post-Mao effort to limit population began with unofficial
restrictions on family size in the early 1970's; most notably, the
"largely voluntary 'late, long, and few' policy, which called for later
childbearing, greater spacing between children, and fewer children"
(Hesketh et al. 2005). In 1979, these reproductive restrictions became a
mandatory national policy known as the one-child family policy. This
government reform garnered international criticism for strict control of
reproductive rights and has been accused of promoting sex-selective
abortions, female infanticide, and forced sterilizations. While the
policy is a drastic measure to implement "small-family culture", the
enforcement of the one-child rule varies considerably especially from
rural to urban areas (Hesketh et al. 2005). Compliance to and
exceptions from the one-child rule are decided primarily by local
officials, which creates ambiguity in the policy goals. However, certain
general factors are important to understanding the relationship between
the one-child policy and urban versus rural residence customs: (1) the
policy is strictly enforced for urban residents, with few exceptions; (2)
in rural areas, a second child is often permitted after five years if the
first child is a girl; (3) in remote, less populated areas and rural areas
with labor shortages, second children are permitted; and (4) a second
child is permitted for rural couples where the husband has settled in the
home of his wife's parents (i.e. matrilocal residence) (Croll 1985;
Davin 1985; Hesketh et al. 2005). Different applications of the onechild policy from rural to urban areas yield different outcomes in
family sizes and composition.
Rural and Urban Demographics under the One-Child Policy

Now, a generation after the one-child policy was instituted, the
diverging demography of rural and urban populations is evident. New
research documents these results and can offer some clues to a parallel
divergence in post-marital residence rules.
The "demographic
determinist" view is one theory used to explain changes in family
structure and shifts away from patrilocality, where "smaller families
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mean that there will be fewer brothers available to live with a surviving
parent" (Lavely & Ren 1992).
Results of the 2001 National Planning and Reproductive
Health Survey show an expected decrease in China's population, but
also noticeably different rural to urban demographic outcomes.
Largely due to the voluntary policy enacted from 1970 to 1979, the
total fertility rate (the mean number of children born per woman) in
China dropped from 5.9 to 2.9. From 1979, the year the one-child
policy went into effect, a subsequent decline in fertility followed - from
2.9 to 1.7 in 2004. Since the one-child restriction is more lenient in
rural areas, the 2004 total fertility rate shows regional variation "with a
rate of 1.3 in urban areas and just under 2.0 in rural areas" (Hesketh et
al. 2005). The data reveal a "distinct demographic pattern of urban
families with predominantly one child and rural families with
predominantly two children" (2005).
An assessment of the sex ratio at birth (the proportion of male
live births to female live births) also shows regional variation from
urban to rural areas in China. The data illustrate an overall increase in
male to female births from 1.06 in 1979, to 1.11 in 1988, to 1.17 in
2001. These fmdings also demonstrate that sex ratios vary locally and
by birth order. The sex ratio is higher for a first child born in urban
areas (1.13) than in rural areas (1.05), see Table 1. The ratio climbs
even further for second order children, with 1.30 in urban areas and
1.23 in rural areas (Hesketh et al. 2005).
Birth Order

In Urban
Areas

In Rural
Areas

Overall

First child

1.13

1.05

1.06

Second child

1.30

1.23

1.24

Third child
Fourth child or more
Average of all birth
orders

1.19
1.19

1.29
1.32

1.28
1.31

1.16

1.15

1.15

Table 1. Ratio of Men to Women According to Birth Order in China,
1980 to 2001 (Hesketh et al. 2005)
Several factors could account for these figures: (1) stricter
adherence to the one child rule in urban areas and a strong preference
for sons overall would increase sex-selective abortions with the first
pregnancy in urban areas and with the second and subsequent
28

pregnancies in rural areas, (2) non-registration of female births, and (3),
very rarely, female infanticide and less aggressive medical treatment of
sick female infants (Hesketh et al. 2005). However, the distorted sex
ratio is not attributed solely to the one-child policy and researchers
indicate that a high sex ratio occurred prior to the Communist
Revolution in 1949.
Parents who believe that only a son will provide for them in
their old age tend not to support or cooperate with the new one-childper-family ideal and fertility control efforts, especially when they
already have one child who is a daughter. To the extent that patrilocal
residence customs continue to be practiced in contemporary China,
parents will want sons as old age insurance and consider daughters of
less value, and parents continue having children until they have a son or
enough sons to provide for them in their old age (Enge11984).
Long-standing cultural preferences for male heirs compete
strongly with populations controls and are tied directly to patrilocality.
In an effort to further understand the discernable differences in
demography from urban to rural areas, government incentives to follow
the one-child policy also provide some answers.
Incentives and Disincentives of Social Reforms

The family-planning strategy outlined by the one-child policy
relies not only on political persuasion and voluntary compliance, but on
a system of economic rewards and sanctions (Dalsimer & Nisonoff
1987). Economic benefits to families with only-children include
housing priorities, wage bonuses, extra work points, and additional
maternity leave for mothers who pledge to have one child. Only
children are entitled to free medical care, priority in nursery, school,
and university enrollment, and priority in employment placement after
graduation (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987). Parents of an only-child are
entitled to a form of social security upon retirement (Croll 1985).
Researchers note, however, that many of these incentives
"hold little appeal for rural families" and, thus, the incentives "have
been more effective" for urban families (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987).
Wage bonuses, work points, and maternity leave have little value to
men and women working in rural areas on family farms. Housing
priorities only apply to city dwellers where space is limited. And, free
health care is often the only benefit that many rural children can take
advantage of (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987). Because these incentives
have failed to convince many rural families to limit family size, fertility
rates appear consistently higher in rural areas. Local officials have
resorted to more convincing incentives to limit rural populations.
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Additional grain allotments, increased family plots, and job placement
in industries are examples of more recent offerings to rural, one-child
families (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987).
Punishments for not complying with the one-child rule can be
severe and disproportionately affect rural families. These disincentives
include "reductions in state grain allotments for second and third
children, expropriation of family goods (such as television sets,
bicycles, or sewing machines), taxes on overquota births, or
reassignment to less fertile plots" (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987).
Interviews with family-planning program managers, however, suggest
that these penalties hold little sway with rural farmers whose labor
source is their offspring. One such administrator "conceded that many
peasant families in South China believe the potential labor productivity
of sons can ultimately offset economic disincentives imposed by the
government" (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987).
Since the adoption and enforcement of reproductive
restrictions, however, the proportion of no-son families in rural China
has increased as a result of sustained low fertility (Li et al. 2003).
These limits to family size are in direct opposition to the patrilineal,
extended family model long-held as the ideal traditional family. The
traditional model continues to shape beliefs about family structure and
residence rules in contemporary rural China: "for many people,
especially the older generation, a large multi generational household is
still regarded as an ideal, as it symbolizes wealth, harmony between
family members, and the filial piety of the young for the old" (Tsui
1989).
Social policies and specifically the one-child rule offer some
clues to post-marital residence choices in contemporary China. The
demographic results of these policies indicate modem patterns of urban
families with one child and a strong son preference and rural families
with two children and a similar preference for sons. Patrilocality and
the distorted sex-ratio seem to present a reciprocal relationship. When
sons remain at home after marriage and take care of their aging parents,
son preference persists and families with only sons or many sons trend
toward patrilocality. However, fewer children and fewer sons, in
particular, begin to alter family decisions on residence. Alternatives
that were once discounted as inferior now become viable options.
Government policies have attempted to disrupt the sonpreference/patrilocal pattern by sanctioning matrilocal residence and
promoting the ability of daughters to maintain family lineage and
provide for their parents.
Fertility and high-sex ratios alone cannot fully explain why a
rural or urban family decides to deviate from the patrilocal tradition.
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Economic policies that came about at the same time as social refonns
did not specifically target marriage or family structure, but contributed
to changes in residence practices in rural and urban China over time.
The Influence ofAgricultural and Economic Reforms

The Communist Revolution in China brought about a number of
changes in access to economic resources and how people earn a living.
This reorganization, like social refonns, impacted family structures and
customs. The new refonns were based on the "unselfish, collectivist
orientation emphasized by the Communist Party" and were in direct
contrast to "traditional familism, which calls for self-sacrifice for
Economic factors that
parents and ancestors" (Tsui 1989).
predominantly affect decisions of post-marital residence in rural and
urban areas are individuals' access to employment, the issue of old age
security, and the distribution of wealth within family units.
Economic Opportunities and Organization

Urban families differ from rural families in economic
organization in contemporary China and this affects residence patterns
after marriage (Wolf 1985). Married sons and daughters have different
access to employment in rural and urban areas and ideas about wealth
are shaped by government policies. Early communist refonns and
economic development strategies, such as the Great Leap Forward
(1958 to 1960) pushed gender equality in the workforce and
subsequently saw a great number of women entering rural and urban
labor roles for the first time (Croll 1983; Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987).
In rural areas, ideas of gender equality fell short as men were
promoted to higher paying jobs in dam building, irrigation, and
reforestation - leaving field work to rural women (Dalsimer & Nisonoff
1987). Patriarchal systems were maintained even with the adoption of
agricultural communes. Women became workers in the field, in
addition to the home, and men were agricultural supervisors and heads
of households. Since males had greater access to and control over
economic and agricultural resources, preferences for sons continued
and patrilocality continued.
In the mid- 1970's, as government planners were reassessing
population controls they adopted new agricultural policies with the goal
of increasing rural productivity. The new policies dissolved collective
fanns and restored agricultural production to the pre-revolutionary
family unit (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987; Lavely & Ren 1992). Under
the new "family responsibility system", communally owned fanns were
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divided into family owned plots for cultivation. Production quotas
allowed families to keep surpluses and instituted penalties for
shortages. A subsequent increase in agricultural production meant that
families could afford more children and more offspring, in turn, would
provide more labor. The restoration of family farming units, therefore,
seemed to be in direct opposition to social policies that limit the
number of children in the family (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987).
While the return to the traditional family· economic
organization reinforced patrilocal and patrilineal systems in the
countryside, many rural women were given new employment
alternatives through another economic policy. Coinciding with the
dissolution of collective farms, the government promoted additional
strategies to increase "domestic sideline production" in rural
households (Croll 1983: 30). These sideline activities were targeted for
export and included animal husbandry, cultivation of fruits and wild
plants, handicraft industries like lace making, basket weaving, sewing,
and knitting (Croll 1983; Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987). Many of the
production activities were undertaken by female members of rural
households and the economic opportunities resulted in a marked
increase in household income (Croll 1983). With greater economic
opportunities in rural areas, the potential to change traditional family
customs increased.
Lavely and Ren (1992) found that, while
agricultural reforms in rural Taiwan increased extended families, new
family structures arose where family labor was divided between
agriculture and industry. They say, "this new version of the complex
household is a far more co-operative and egalitarian organization than
the traditional patriarchal grand family" (Lavely & Ren 1992). New
economic organization in rural Chinese families opened the door for
new patterns of post-marital residence.
Revolutionary and post-Mao economic reforms created
different employment opportunities in urban areas.
Since the
establishment of communism, China's urban economy was dominated
by "small street or neighbourhood factories which are based on low
capital investment, are labour intensive and are collectively owned by
the workers" (Croll 1983: 47). The influx of women into the urban
labor force provided the fIrst opportunities for many women to gain
employment outside of their homes. Education opportunities were
greater for girls in urban areas and allowed many women to acquire
production and service roles traditionally held by men. More recently
urban individuals have been encouraged by the government to establish
private enterprises in manufacturing and providing services (Croll
1983). This entrepreneurial motivation has translated into a new sense
of economic independence for younger men and women. In an
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examination of Chinese urban family structure, Tsui (1989) found "an
increasingly individualistic attitude toward life has developed among
young people" which is evident in "a growing interest in material
comfort and individual conjugal units." Tsui's observations clearly
convey how economic transformations in urban areas foster a shift
toward neolocal residence patterns.
Old Age Security as a Factor in Post-Marital Residence Rules
Traditionally and today, a primary economic concern for both
urban and rural families in China and a strong motivation for
patrilocality is the issue of old age security. Although the government
has repeatedly attempted to address the issue, economic planners have
yet to devise an effective system:
In 1980, only 19 percent of the total work force was eligible for
retirement benefits; in the countryside, less than half a million out of a
total rural population of 800 million were receiving pensions in 1981.
Unless adequate old-age security is universally provided, the elderly in
China will remain dependent on their children for financial and social
support. Even though the welfare system, Five Guarantees (food,
clothing, shelter, child care, and burial), is available in rural areas for
retirees who have no close relatives, the system is not regarded as a
desirable alternative because the economic support is minimal and the
loss of face is great. (Hong 1987)
This critical concern for old age security reinforces patrilocality and
reliance on sons for economic support, especially in rural areas.
Although patrilocality still dominates, the increasing trend of matrilocal
marriages in rural China may indicate a growing reliance on daughters
for old age security rather than acceptance of government welfare. A
key government decree that supports this trend was the move to give
daughters equal rights of inheritance. Where, historically, daughters
had no rights to family property or wealth and dowries were often only
symbolic, this reform gave rural and urban daughters more power
within and outside of the family unit (Watson & Ebrey 1991).
Wealth Distribution within Rural and Urban Families
In many rural families, male heads of households sign
contracts for agricultural plots and control family wealth (Dalsimer &
Nisonoff 1987). Even the sideline activities of women that contribute
to household income are regulated by men. Within these families,
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parents invest in their children so that they are taken care of in old age.
The economic productivity of younger individuals, married or not,
helps support elderly relatives who have limited means of generating
personal income in rural areas, but contribute to family welfare through
activities such as childcare. Social reforms that limit family size are
seen as threats to the economic security of older Chinese who rely on
their children and grandchildren. In spite of increases in agricultural
production, strict family planning laws weaken the system of extended
families and can reduce the patrilineal network to direct lineal kin
(Hong 1987). The one-child policy creates a "1-2-4" family structure
where, before marriage, a single child may be economically supporting
two parents and four grandparents. Under these circumstances,
neolocal residence, either before or after marriage, is a rare option in
rural areas.
Place of Residence

Percentage

Neolocal

48.33 (2,414)

Patrilocal

40.02 (2,003)

Matrilocal

9.69 (485)

Other

2.06 (103)

Total

100 (5,005)

Table 2. Place of Residence Right After Marriage (Tsui 1989: 745)
Reproduction restrictions do not pose the same problems of
old age security in cities where "the economic dependence of the parent
on the child has been gradually diminishing in urban China" (Tsui
1989). The Five-City Survey conducted in 1982 examined family
structures in the five largest cities in China. The results "showed that
50% of urban people aged 60 to 80 were either gainfully employed or
receiving a retirement pension" (Tsui 1989). In urban areas, seniority
and longevity in wage distribution create intergenerational differences
in wealth and contribute to fmancial dependence of the young on the
old (Tsui 1989). With strict enforcement of the one-child rule in cities,
the 1-2-4 system is creating an urban culture of "little emperors" and
"little empresses". Tsui (1989) reports that young married couples
often live with their parents (patrilocally or matrilocally) for a period of
time or live in their own residence (neolocally) and receive financial
support from their parents. With specific regard to post-marital
residence, the survey data show a steady increase in matrilocality since
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the 1940's and a dramatic shift toward neolocal residence in
contemporary urban China, see Table 2 (Tsui 1989).
Furthermore, several researchers indicate that, while
patrilocality is still common (and dominant) in many urban areas, its
persistence as a long-term residence strategy is much more in question.
Lavely and Ren (1992) address this issue: "the substantial decline in the
length of co-residence indicates that patrilocal marriage may be on its
way to becoming a ritual interlude rather than a long-term
commitment." It is common practice for couples to receive free room
and board in their parents' house after marriage, but this situation is
"likely to be temporary if we consider the growing aspiration for
privacy among the young in urban China" (Tsui 1989). This form of
transient residence would not be limited to patrilocality. In an
increasing number of cases, urban couples are deciding to live with the
wife's parents, matrilocally, even for a short period of time for
economic considerations (Tsui 1989).
Constraints to Change in Post-marital Residence Rules

Economic dependence and independence are strong motivators for
deciding to reside matrilocally or neolocally. As factors like these
encourage change from traditional residence rules, other factors can be
powerful constraints. Marriage customs like residence rules do not
exist as isolated entities, but depend on a complex cultural system to
constantly reinforce and maintain their function in a society. When
examined from a demographic or economic perspective, practicality
seems to dictate an easy transition from traditional customs. However,
following hundreds of years of traditional residence practices
throughout China, a number of beliefs have evolved that preserve the
patrilocal, patrilineal family system.
Female Sexuality and Sex Taboos

One of the strongest obstacles to change in traditional postmarital residence is overcoming long held beliefs about female
sexuality and family dynamics. Taboos on sexuality and reproduction
uphold patriarchal family structures and seem to be more dominant in
rural areas. In rural north China, Han (2003) examined a cultural taboo
referred to locally as Bufafang - which forbids women to have sexual
intercourse in their natal home. Bufafang is described as a belief that,
"from the parents' point of view, a daughter's (married or not)
sexuality in the natal home brings bad luck to sons, especially to those
sons who live together with the parents" (Han 2003).
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The sex taboo is often less about female sexual purity and
more about propriety in where to have sex and the importance of
maintaining male dominated households. If an unmarried daughter has
sex with her boyfriend in her natal home it is considered Bufafang, but
if that same act takes place in the boyfriend's home, the sex taboo does
not apply, even though premarital sex is strongly discouraged (Han
2003). This taboo extends to daughters after marriage and parents are
vigilant in heeding off bad luck for their sons.
Other taboos related to childbirth also reinforce patrilocal
post-marital residence. In many farming communities, the cultural idea
persists that women should not deliver babies in their natal homes (Han
2003). The practice of confinement after childbirth also restricts a
woman to her husband's home. Since the child is part of her husband's
patriline and not the responsibility of her natal home, breaking these
taboos are believed to bring harm to her natal home (Han 2003). The
persistence of these taboos and cultural beliefs, predominantly in rural
areas, prove to be powerful constraints to may Chinese families III
deviating from patrilocality.
The Stigma of Matrilocal Marriage

In addition to specific local taboos about post-marital
residence, the widespread view of matrilocal marriage as inferior and
secondary endures in contemporary China and can prevent its increase
as an alternative to patrilocality. Wolf (1985) found that in traditional
south China "a man contemplating an uxorilocal marriage for a
daughter had to get permission from his brothers and from his lineage,
and both were prone to say no" (199). Families were reluctant to see
wealth, property, and power passed out of direct descent. Matrilocal
marriages were considered secondary choices under disgraceful
circumstances and families involved lost a measure of respect in their
communities (Han 2003). The difficulties in arranging and residing in
a matrilocal marriage extended beyond the family unit to the son-inlaw. The called-in son-in-law suffered serious criticism and was often
considered inferior to other married men, in spite of the fact that most
marriages at the time were arranged and completely out of his hands
(Han 2003; Pasternak et al. 1997).
Even as family structures and compositions are changed by
social and economic forces, patrilocality remains "overwhelmingly
dominant in contemporary rural China" (Li et al. 2003). Matrilocal
residence still carries high stigmas for families and long-standing
patterns of patrilineage are difficult to change. Wolf (1985) explains
the continued preference for patrilocality:
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The reasons rural women prefer to live with their sons are quite simple.
Only women who have failed to produce sons live with their daughters,
and they are considered to be living on charity (unless, as only rarely
happens, their daughter married-in a husband). Even a woman who
despises her daughter-in-law and has little affection for her son will still
live with them rather than a beloved daughter. A daughter's house is
someone else's house and a daughter belongs to someone else's family.
(223)
Son preference is equal, ifnot stronger, in urban families who are more
restricted to the one-child rule, as evident in the higher sex-ratios, see
Table 1. However, matrilocal residence is higher in urban areas and
seems to carry fewer stigmas (Lavely & Ren 1992; Tsui 1989).
Urban Constraints to Change in Post-Marital Residence Rules

In large cities, certain traditions coupled with environmental
conditions promote patrilocality. Urban children that take care of their
parents according to traditional custom are expected to live at the
latter's house (Tsui 1989). Often in urban China, a child takes over a
parent's job after the parent retires and, in many cases, they "have to
live with the parents because they usually cannot get a room
assignment while their parents live in a company house" (Tsui 1989).
So, even where individuals have their own income, neolocality can be
prevented by shear lack of housing. This constraint to residence
change in urban areas appears to be more a consequence of
industrialization and less a product of tradition.
Conclusion

In rural China today, patrilocality remains the dominant form
of post-marital residence. In many rural provinces, studies suggest that
"the chances that a bride will reside with her husband's parents ... after
marriage has remained stable or even risen since 1950" (Lavely & Ren
1992). However, the pressures of social and economic reform are
becoming evident in post-marital residence choices. A rise in
matrilocality in rural areas indicates a shift in residence customs to deal
with low family sizes and high sex ratios.
While constraints to the practice of matrilocality are seen more
in rural areas, recent research shows that the power of sex taboos in
many of these local regions is weakening. Han's (2003) research of
Bufafang in rural north China demonstrates this change: "in all cases of
concern about Bufafang, the daughters/sisters seemed unaware of
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Bufafang and its potential danger, suggesting that Bufafang may be
fading away among the younger generation." As taboos and beliefs
that enforce patrilocal residence lessen, rural families with few sons or
only daughters may decide to live matrilocally to continue the family
line and ensure old age security. The increasing necessity of
alternatives to patrilocality indicates a change that is more often
contingent and based on individual family circumstances and not a
general institutional trend toward matrilocal residence (Li et al. 2003).
Changes in post-marital residence in urban China during the
same time period involve equally complicated determinants and
motivations.
Notions of modernization, westernization, and
industrialization offer only simple explanations to the rise of neolocal
residence in cities and do not address the complexity of factors that
have contributed to this change over the last century (Pasternak 1968).
Greater access to personal income and higher education coupled with
lower fertility have created an urban culture of only children who prefer
to live on their own or only briefly with their parents after marriage.
The post-marital residence decision in urban China is not so
easily equated with other industrialized nations, however. Despite the
country's rapid globalization of a number of its institutions, many
family customs and practices remain, in an etic perspective, entrenched
in tradition. In contemporary China, the strong pressure to marry is
tied to the belief that Chinese young people do not achieve adult status
until marriage. Those that stay single can be forced into "crowded,
same-sex dormitories maintained for young unmarrieds at some
worksites" (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987). Considering this scenario,
residence choice should be considered not only as a practice postmarriage, but as an influence on the decision to marry at all. Future
research in this area should take advantage of China's increasing move
out of isolationism and incorporate growing access to the Chinese
perspectives on changes within their own culture.

References
Croll, E. (1981) The Politics of Marriage in Contemporary China.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
___ . (1983) Chinese Women since Mao. London: Zed Books Ltd.
___. (1985) "Introduction: Fertility Norms and Family Size in
China". In Croll, E, Davin, D & Kane, P (Eds) China's OneChild Family Policy. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.

38

Dalsimer, M and Nisonoff, L. (1987) "The Implications of the New
Agricultural and One-Child Policies for Rural Chinese
Women". Feminist Studies 13:583-607.
Davin, D. (1985) "The Single-child Family Policy in the Countryside".
In Croll, E, Davin, D & Kane, P (Eds) China's One-Child
Family Policy. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.
Davis, D and Harrell, S. (1993) Chinese Families in the Post-Mao Era.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Ebrey, PB. (1993) The Inner Quarters: Marriage and the Lives of
Chinese Women in the Sung Period. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Engel, JW. (1984) "Marriage in the People's Republic of China:
Analysis of a New Law". Journal of Marriage and Family
46:955-961.
Goody, 1. (1976) Production and Reproduction: A Comparative Study
of Domestic Domain. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Han, H. (2003) "Sexuality and Uxorilocal Marriage in Rural North
China: Impacts of the One-Child-One-Family Policy on
Gender and Kinship". Journal ofFamily History 28:453-459.
Hesketh, T, Li, L, and Xing, ZW. (2005) "The Effect of China's OneChild Family Policy after 25 Years". The New England
Journal of Medicine 353:1171-1176.
Hong, LK. (1987) "Potential Effects of the One-Child Policy on
Gender Equality in the People's Republic of China". Gender
and Society 1:317-326.
Lavely, Wand Ren, X. (1992) "Patrilocality and Early Marital CoResidence in Rural China, 1955-85". The China Quarterly
l30:378-391.
Li, S, Feldman, MW and Li, N. (2000) "Cultural Transmission of
Uxorilocal Marriage in Lueyang, China". The Journal of
Family History 25:158-177.
_ _ . (2003) "Acceptance of Two Types of Uxorilocal Marriage in
Contemporary Rural China: The Case of Lueyang". Journal of
Family History 28:314-333.
Ortner, SB. (2001) "Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties". In
Erikson, PA and Murphy, LD (Eds) Readingsfor a History of
Anthropological Theory. Ontario: Broadview Press.
Palmer, M. (1995) "The Re-Emergence of Family Law in Post Mao
China: Marriage, Divorce and Reproduction". The China
Quarterly 141: llO-l34.
Pasternak, B. (1968) "Atrophy of Patrilineal Bonds in a Chinese
Village in Historical Perspective". Ethnohistory 15:293-327.
39

Pasternak, B, Ember, CR and Ember, M. (1997) Sex, Gender, and
Kinship: A Cross-Cultural Perspective. New Jersey: Prentice
Hall.
Schnaiberg, A. (1970) "Rural-Urban Residence and Modernism: A
Study of Ankara Province, Turkey". Demography 7:71-85.
Sjoberg, G. (1956) "Familial Organization in the Preindustrial City".
Marriage and Family Living 18:30-36.
Tsui, M. (1989) "Changes in Chinese Urban Family Structure". Journal
of Marriage and the Family 51:737-747.
Watson, RS and Ebrey, PB. (1991) Marriage and Inequality in Chinese
Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wolf, M. (1985) Revolution Postponed: Women in Contemporary
China. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

40

